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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
No tax policy analysis stands complete without examination of 
equity implications. But despite its role as a traditional pillar of tax policy 
analysis, equity itself remains a controversial concept.
 1
 What is meant by the 
term equity? How should it be measured? Is there more than one type of 
equity? What is the relationship of different types of equity to each other? 
For decades, scholars and policy makers have explored the possibility that 
equity is best understood as two distinct concepts — vertical equity and 
horizontal equity — both of which must be evaluated.2 Horizontal equity 
                                                 
*Diane Ring is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School.  James 
Repetti is the William J. Kenealy, S.J. Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School. This Article was originally published as Chapter 6 in THE PROPER TAX 
BASE: STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL MCDANIEL (Yariv Brauner & Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr. eds., Kluwer Law International, 2012), and is reprinted with 
permission. 
1. Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal Equity and Vertical 
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) [hereinafter 
McDaniel & Repetti, Horizontal Equity]. 
2. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 160 (1959) 
[hereinafter MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE]; Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: 
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT‘L TAX J. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Kaplow, 
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(HE) is defined to mean that equals should be treated alike.
3
 Vertical equity 
(VE) is defined to mean that an appropriate distinction should be made in the 
treatment of people who are not alike.
4
 Although disagreement exists,
 
HE in 
our tax system has generally been thought to require that individuals with the 
same income should pay the same tax. VE has generally been thought to 
require a progressive rate structure that imposes progressively higher rates on 
individuals with higher incomes. Despite frequent reliance on both HE and 
VE in tax policy analysis over the years, scholars have engaged in an active 
and vibrant debate about whether HE has any significance independent of 
VE in designing a tax system. This dispute has been best captured by the 
debate between two economists, Richard Musgrave and Louis Kaplow.  
Kaplow argued in 1989 that HE is not a useful tool for tax policy 
because it has no normative content and no significance distinct from VE.
5
 
Kaplow further asserted that the use of HE in tax policy analysis is harmful 
because ―it will lead policymakers astray when they are encouraged to 
sacrifice other values in the pursuit of HE.‖6 Thirty years earlier, in 1959, 
Musgrave (Musgrave I) had also concluded that HE lacked normative 
content. He stated:  
 
The requirements of horizontal and vertical equity 
are but different sides of the same coin. If there is no 
specified reason for discriminating among unequals, how 
can there be a reason for avoiding discrimination among 
equals? Without a scheme of vertical equity, the requirement 
of horizontal equity at best becomes a safeguard against 
capricious discrimination — a safeguard which might be  
                                                                                                                   
HE I]; Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. (1992) 
[hereinafter Kaplow, HE II]; Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 
43 NAT‘L TAX J. 113 (1990) [hereinafter Musgrave, HE]; Richard A. Musgrave, 
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993). 
3. Kaplow, HE I, supra note 2, at 140–41; MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE, 
supra note 2, at 113. 
4.  Kaplow, HE I, supra note 2, at 140–41; MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE, 
supra note 2, at 113. 
5. Kaplow, HE I, supra note 2. 
6. Id. at 140. See also, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle 
of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL‘Y. REV. 43, 44–62 (2006) (arguing that it is 
possible to design a tax system that is both economically efficient and distributive 
but that ―blatantly violates‖ HE). For example, this might occur because some 
variations of HE require that the order in which taxpayers are ranked by income be 
preserved in a tax reform. As discussed, in notes 47–80, the forms of HE that require 
pre-tax ordinal rankings to be preserved are really applying VE, not HE. Thus, the 
tension created by such regimes is in fact a tension between efficiency and the 
distributive justice goals specified by the particular tax system. 
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provided equally well by a requirement that taxes be 
distributed at random.
7
 
 
Indeed, Musgrave‘s analysis went a step further. He argued, in Musgrave I, 
that both HE and VE were inadequate for formulating tax policy because 
both depended on a determination of some measure for distinguishing equals 
and unequals.
8
 He reasoned, ―An objective index of equality or inequality is 
needed to translate either principle into a specific tax system.‖9 In other 
words, the notion that equals should be treated equally requires specification 
of the criteria used to determine who is equal and who is unequal, and that 
specification will in turn require appeal to some form of distributive justice. 
However, in response to Kaplow‘s 1989 assertion, Musgrave 
reassessed his own views and decided that he had been wrong (Musgrave II). 
After surveying various forms of distributive justice, he concluded that HE 
has a normative basis that is firmer than VE, stating:  
 
[T]he requirement of HE remains essentially unchanged 
under the various formulations of distributive justice, 
ranging from Lockean entitlement over utilitarianism and 
fairness solutions. That of VE, on the contrary, undergoes 
drastic change under the various approaches. While HE is 
met by the various VE outcomes, this does not mean that HE 
is derived from VE. If anything, it suggests that HE is a 
stronger primary rule.
10
 
 
In their 1993 article, Paul McDaniel and James Repetti (M-R) 
reviewed this pivotal debate regarding the meaning of VE and HE, and 
ultimately agreed with Musgrave I and with Kaplow that both HE and VE 
lack independent significance and should be best understood as a single 
concept.
11
 But HE has not died. In the intervening years HE has survived as a 
frequently articulated independent policy ground in the assessment of tax 
policy. Why? Was earlier analysis faulty, or is something else at work in the 
tax literature? Almost two decades later, this paper reexamines the 
appropriate role of HE in tax policy and the debate that has occurred 
subsequent to the 1993 M-R paper. In this paper, we agree with Musgrave I‘s 
original assessment and later determinations by Kaplow and M-R. HE does 
not serve a useful role in formulating tax policy. HE and VE are merely both 
sides of the same coin, because starting an analysis by asking what the  
                                                 
7. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 2, at 160. 
8. Id. at 161.  
9. Id.  
10. Musgrave, HE, supra note 2, at 116–17. 
11. See McDaniel & Repetti, Horizontal Equity, supra note 1. 
138 Florida Tax Review        [Vol. 13:3 
 
 
appropriate criteria are to determine which persons are not alike yields the 
same result as starting the analysis by asking what criteria should be used to 
determine whether persons are alike. In addition, we agree with Musgrave I 
and M-R that VE also is not useful without appeal to a theory of distributive 
justice.   
But there are important reasons why debate about the role of HE has 
persisted. Although HE is not a useful substantive tool for tax policy design, 
it may serve a useful role in: (1) establishing the process to be followed to 
design tax policy; and (2) assessing the administration of the resulting rules. 
The first two of these reasons mirrors the insight of Musgrave II. As urged 
above, equality (the core vision of HE) is not independently important in 
formulating tax policy because taxation is an algorithm that will always tax 
equally those defined as equals.
12
 Equality does, however, define the process 
for designing a tax system by requiring that the government justify its 
selection of criteria to measure who is equal (and not equal).
13
 HE lingers in 
the tax debate because, by starting with the notion that all should be treated 
equally, HE requires a government to articulate a justification for any tax 
policy that imposes ―different‖ taxation. HE tells us that government should 
communicate the rationale for different treatment; however, it does not tell 
us what the treatment should be. 
Moving to the level of administration of the tax system, some tax 
scholars have relied on HE to serve as a benchmark for assessing whether 
governmental administration of the tax law is fair. As Musgrave I observed 
(somewhat negatively), ―[i]n the absence of vertical equity norms, the case 
for horizontal equity is reduced to providing protection against malicious 
discrimination, an objective which might be met more simply by a tax 
lottery.‖14 As considered more extensively below,15 HE could be viewed as a 
safeguard against arbitrary enforcement of tax laws and, therefore, stays at 
the forefront of tax consciousness because arbitrary enforcement would be 
particularly pernicious in a system that does not usually make public 
                                                 
12. This result is not avoided by employing a different definition for HE 
that looks to see whether ―similar‖ taxpayers (rather than the ―same‖ taxpayers) are 
taxed in a ―similar‖ way (rather than the ―same‖ way). Whatever criteria are used to 
identify taxpayers who are ―similar‖ will result in such taxpayers being taxed in a 
―similar‖ way. 
13. Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
693, 714 and 748–50 (1990) (arguing that a right to equality requires a decision-
maker to provide a ―rational explanation of a difference in treatment‖) [hereinafter 
Simons, Egalitarian Norms].  
14. Richard A. Musgrave, ET, OT and SBT, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 4 (1976).15. 
See infra test accompanying notes 56–62. 
15. See infra test accompanying notes 56–62. 
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disclosures regarding each taxpayer‘s liability for taxes.16 HE does not define 
the form of enforcement, but does require the government to justify why 
enforcement is not uniform. 
Part II of this article describes why HE and VE lack normative 
content. Part III considers and rejects arguments that have been offered after 
the M-R article to defend the role of HE. Part IV suggests that while HE is 
not helpful in designing a tax system because it provides no guidance about 
what the system should look like, support for HE has persisted because of a 
shared belief that government should communicate the rationale for treating 
people differently. HE tells us that government should communicate the 
rationale for different treatment, but it does not tell us what that different 
treatment should be. Part IV further suggests that support for the role of HE 
may also be rooted in the notion that government should be even-handed in 
its enforcement of tax laws. Part IV observes, however, that HE is not 
helpful in insuring even-handed enforcement. In a world of finite resources, 
not every taxpayer can be audited. In deciding who should be audited, it is 
necessary to refer to something beyond HE. Part V concludes this article. 
 
II. WHY HE AND VE LACK NORMATIVE CONTENT 
 
In their review of the Musgrave-Kaplow debate, M-R agreed with 
Musgrave I that VE, the notion that an appropriate difference should be made 
among taxpayers who are different, lacks normative content because a theory 
of distributive justice is required to determine the ―appropriate‖ difference 
that should be made.
17
 For example, VE, by itself, does not lead to the 
conclusion that we need a progressive income tax. It is necessary to refer to 
an underlying theory of justice and to make some key economic assumptions 
in order to conclude that a progressive rate structure is desirable.
18
 We might, 
for example, justify the imposition of progressive tax rates on income based 
on a theory of justice that believes equal tax burdens should be imposed on 
all taxpayers and on a key assumption about the rate at which the utility of 
income decreases as income increases.
19
 If the utility of income decreases at 
an accelerating rate as income increases, a progressive rate structure is 
required to impose equal burdens on taxpayers.
20
 It is the reference to some 
                                                 
16. Most tax returns are not publicly disclosed. Public charities, however, 
are required to publicly disclose their federal tax returns. I.R.C. § 6104(d). 
17. McDaniel & Repetti, Horizontal Equity, supra note 1. 
18. Id. at 610. 
19. Id. 
20. Technically, the rate will be ―progressive, proportional, or regressive, 
depending on whether the elasticity of the marginal income utility with respect to 
income is [, respectively,] greater than, equal to, or less than [one].‖ RICHARD A. 
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN, THEORY AND PRACTICE 
200 (1973) [hereinafter MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE]. 
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outside normative theory and economic assumptions, rather than reference to 
VE alone, that designs the tax system.   
M-R also concluded, as had Kaplow and Musgrave I, that HE lacks 
independent significance for two reasons.
21
 First, a theory of distributive 
justice that treats different taxpayers differently will always require that 
equals be treated equally. For example, a system that seeks to impose equal 
burdens on taxpayers will require that identical burdens be imposed on 
taxpayers with what has been determined to be equal income. Similarly, a 
system that imposes tax burdens based on the taxpayers‘ abilities to pay will 
impose the same burden on taxpayers that have the same ability to pay (i.e. 
that have the same income).  HE adds nothing to the design of the system 
and indeed may distract from the proper consideration of the more 
fundamental issues of distributive justice that underlie the treatment of 
taxpayers.
22
 This is particularly true in a tax system, where liability is 
calculated by mechanically applying an algorithm to the selected tax base. 
The focus should be on the selection of the tax base.   
Second, and more broadly, the notion that equals should be treated 
equally requires specification of the criteria used to determine who is equal. 
Once the criteria for determining equality are selected, it follows that those 
with the same criteria should be treated the same.
23
 But selection of the 
                                                 
21. McDaniel & Repetti, Horizontal Equity, supra note 1, at 612–13. 
22. Id. at 620–21. See Thomas D. Griffith, Should “Tax Norms” be 
Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury 
Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1156–57 (1993); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax 
Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2008) (criticizing VE and HE as being 
concerned only with economic differences of taxpayers and consequently foreclosing 
―consideration of non-economic forms of difference (e.g., of race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation, or physical ability) when determining the appropriate allocation 
of societal burdens, even though these other forms of difference have served, and 
continue to serve, as the basis for invidious discrimination that already imposes 
heavy burdens on its victims.‖); Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, 
Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 422–24 (2004) 
(observing that application of VE and HE require appeal to underlying notions of 
fairness); See also Elkins, supra note 6, at 86–87 (concluding that several possible 
justifications for horizontal equity can all be proved unsuccessful; and suggesting 
that ―justification of horizontal equity depends upon the moral entitlement of each 
individual to his free-market holdings.‖). Elkins‘ conclusions about the relationship 
between HE and the taxpayer‘s claim to keep the post-market/pre-tax holdings itself 
demonstrates that even this use of HE is predicated on a normative and distributive 
conclusion derived outside of HE. 
23. In the related area of constitutional law, Peter Westen has argued that 
equality is a tautology because once the criteria for determining whether persons are 
the same have been established, it follows that they will be treated similarly. Peter 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547–48 (1982). As in 
the tax area, this view has stirred significant debate. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, 
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criteria to measure equality requires that we once again refer to distributive 
justice. For example, should equality be based upon equal incomes or equal 
amounts of consumption? Those concerned about persons with few resources 
may be troubled by the distributive effect of a consumption tax and, 
therefore, may favor an income tax. Regardless of whether one believes that 
the criteria must reflect the overall vision of distributive justice in society
24
 
or alternatively can be more tightly linked to the tax system,
25
 selection of 
the criteria to measure equality will always lead back to distributive justice 
with the result that HE will always be subsumed within VE.    
M-R concluded, as had Musgrave I, that the use of VE and HE in 
designing a tax system is a poor proxy for the actual theory of distributive 
justice that underpins the design of the tax system and that questions about 
tax design should be directed to the specific theory of distributive justice. 
Subsequently, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel took the analysis a step 
further. They argued that forms of distributive justice frequently applied by 
tax theorists to design tax systems — determining the tax based on ―benefit‖ 
received by taxpayers or requiring ―equal sacrifices‖ by taxpayers — were 
also useless in designing a tax system that seeks to achieve justice.
26
 They 
argued that identifying a just tax requires looking outside the tax system and 
focusing on the ―broader principles of justice in government.‖27 They reason 
that the starting point of a tax, such as each taxpayer‘s income, is itself the 
product of government policies. Evaluating an income tax based solely on 
the amount of taxes assessed ignores an important factor — the fairness of 
the pre-tax incomes earned by the taxpayers. Murphy and Nagel view the tax 
system as an instrument that helps achieve governmental objectives for 
justice. They assess the current state of tax policy analysis as inadequate, 
stating: 
                                                                                                                   
Comment on “Empty Ideas:” Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 
YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to 
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the 
Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality 
Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983).  
24. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: 
TAXES AND JUSTICE 15, 25, 30 (2002) (asserting the unbreakable link between tax 
fairness and overall justice) [hereinafter MURPHY & NAGEL, THE MYTH OF 
OWNERSHIP]. 
25. See, e.g., Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Book Review: Tax 
and the Philosopher’s Stone, 89 VA. L. REV. 647, 653–54 (2003) (challenging 
Murphy and Nagel‘s rejection of tax system derived ―fairness‖). See infra text 
accompanying notes 33–35.  
26. MURPHY & NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 24, at 16–19, 
24–30. 
27. Id. at 30. 
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[The] entire [current] approach is flawed in its foundations. 
If the distribution produced by the market is not  
presumptively just, then the correct criteria of distributive 
justice will make no reference whatever to that distribution, 
even as a baseline. Distributive justice is not a matter of 
applying some equitable-seeming function to a morally 
arbitrary initial distribution of welfare. Despite what many 
people implicitly assume, the justice of a tax scheme cannot 
simply be evaluated by checking that average tax rates 
increase fast enough with income . . . . [O]nce we reject the 
assumption that the distribution of welfare produced by the 
market is just, we can no longer offer principles of tax 
fairness apart from broader principles of justice in 
government.
28
 
 
Again, even if one is not fully persuaded by their arguments that 
traditional tax theories, such as the benefits principle or the equal sacrifice 
principle, offer nothing to tax policy, their overarching point that tax system 
design fundamentally turns on decisions about distributive justice and moral 
principles accurately underscores the hollowness of both VE and HE. 
 
III. EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN A DESIGN ROLE FOR HE 
 
This Part reviews arguments offered by scholars post M-R to revive 
and support HE‘s place in shaping substantive tax policy. In 2003, Kevin A. 
                                                 
28. Id. For an earlier argument that tax analysis needs to take into account 
the conditions that gave rise to the distribution of the tax base, see PATRICIA APPS, A 
THEORY OF INEQUALITY AND TAXATION 4 (1981) (―[T]ax theory remains firmly 
grounded upon an innate or inherited endowments theory of inequality. The aim of 
the analysis here is to examine tax incidence and tax distortions taking account of the 
way in which institutional inequality is initiated and perpetuated.‖) (footnote 
omitted). Many others also have noted that economic wellbeing is the result of many 
factors, including the individual‘s initial starting point, the efforts of others, and 
merit. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE 
L.J. 259, 275–79 (1983) (questioning ―those who simply assume that the market 
distributes rewards to people who deserve them and denies rewards to people who do 
not‖); Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to Practical Application: The Vision of a 
Good Society and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 415–18 (2006) 
(―[D]ifficulty with the view of the market as neutral or providing just rewards is that, 
in the real world, people do not enter the market with equal resources including 
identical or otherwise equivalent talents, skills, or backgrounds.‖); Amartya Sen, The 
Moral Standing of the Market, in ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1, 1–19 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul et al. eds., 1995). 
2012] Horizontal Equity Revisited      143 
 
 
Kordana and David H. Tabachnick suggested such a role for HE, but did not 
elaborate. They stated: 
 
While it is true that there can be no blanket rule requiring 
horizontal equity, it does not follow that issues of uniformity 
do not count at all. From what we have argued above with 
respect to the benefit principle and the equal sacrifice 
principle, it should be clear that issues of uniformity can be 
relevant, if subordinate, to distributive aims.
 29
 
  
It is not clear to us exactly what role Kordana and Tabachnick (K-T) 
contemplate for HE because their discussion of the benefit principle and 
equal sacrifice principle did not discuss HE. Indeed, we believe that there is 
little they could have said. The benefit principle ―requires that taxpayers 
contribute, via taxation, in proportion to the benefit they derive from 
government.‖30 The equal sacrifice theory states ―that taxation should reduce 
each taxpayer‘s welfare by an equal amount.‖31 Since K-T do not focus on 
HE, they did not consider the arguments of Musgrave I and Kaplow that HE 
would contribute nothing to the design of a tax system.
32
 To apply the benefit 
or equal sacrifice doctrine, it is first necessary to determine how benefits and 
sacrifice should be measured. For example, should the determination of the 
amounts of benefits received and the sacrifices made in paying taxes be 
based on an assumption that the utility of money declines as income 
increases?
33
 To decide this issue reference must be made to theories of 
welfare economics and theories of declining marginal utility. Once those 
decisions are made, it follows that those obtaining the same utility from 
benefits received or losing the same utility from taxes paid should be treated 
the same. 
In their discussion of the benefit and the equal sacrifice principles, 
K-T examine Murphy and Nagel‘s argument that such theories have no role 
in achieving justice because justice needs to be measured by directly 
                                                 
29. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 25, at 663. 
30. Id. at 653 (quoting MURPHY & NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, 
supra note 24, at 16). 
31. Id. at 661. 
32. HE collapses into VE because it is necessary to determine how benefits 
and sacrifice should be measured in circumstances where persons will have received 
different amounts of benefits and income.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & 
PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 239–42 (3d ed. 
1980); James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax 
Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1137–41 (2008) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy].   
33. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 20, at 
239–42; Repetti, Democracy, supra note 31, at 1137–41.   
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examining the theory of justice that is guiding all governmental functions 
(i.e. taxing and spending) K-T state: 
 
For Murphy and Nagel, the benefit principle is subject to the 
charge of ―myopia‖ — it ignores government spending, that 
is, the provision of public goods and redistribution, and 
gives guidance only about how to raise tax revenue. Their 
basic idea, we think, is that if one is committed to a theory of 
distributive justice, the achievement of the aims of that 
theory may be hampered by any attempt to comply with the 
benefit principle. If the overarching conception of 
distributive justice takes fairness into account but allows for 
justifiable inequalities, criticisms of resulting inequalities on 
the basis of fairness are ill-motivated (because the 
inequalities are justified by the overarching conception of 
distributive justice). The conception of distributive justice 
determines fairness in taxation; therefore, a tax policy that at 
first glance appears inequitable might, all things considered, 
be justified. 
 
For example, a tax structure that is consistent with Rawls‘s 
difference principle may allow for what would appear 
(under, for example, the benefit principle) to be inequities in 
tax policy. However, these inequities are, all things 
considered, justified if the inequities are necessary to 
maximize the position of the least well-off. Thus, the 
question of justice in taxation is not separable from the 
question of overall distributive justice. To the extent the 
benefit principle treats these two questions as separable and 
addresses only the issue of justice in taxation, it is, for 
Murphy and Nagel, objectionable.
34
 
 
  K-T respond to Murphy and Nagel in part by positing situations in 
which the government‘s ―overall distributive justice‖ may leave unanswered 
specific issues pertaining to the design of the tax system. For those specific 
design issues, traditional notions of tax equity can be the tie-breaker. They 
state: 
 
If two or more economic schemes equally maximize the 
demands of the conception of distributive justice, and if one 
scheme contains a tax system that satisfies the benefit 
principle while the other(s) do not, one who held the benefit 
                                                 
34. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 25, at 653–54. 
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principle could invoke it to adjudicate between schemes. 
Doing so is not inconsistent with the maximizing conception 
of distributive justice.
35
 
 
We agree with this insight, but we do not see how it makes the case for an 
independent role for HE in the design of the tax system. Satisfaction of the 
benefit principle (that the tax burden correspond to the level of benefits 
received) will automatically require that those with equal benefits be treated 
the same, assuming that this does not conflict with the governmental scheme 
of ―overall distributive justice.‖  Perhaps K-T envision a similar but 
independent tie-breaker role for HE, where such equivalences occur.
36
 
However, this possible construction of K-T‘s defense of HE ultimately 
would not stand: (1) the tie-breaker reasoning they explicitly used in defense 
of the benefit principle was in their own terms a ―rarely‖ applicable role;37 
and (2) unlike the benefit principle which provides some of its own content, 
HE, even in this limited setting, still has no independent principles to draw 
upon in breaking the tie (any principles it would recite would have already 
formed the basis of VE determinations of taxation). Thus, while K-T make 
the case for application of traditional theories of tax justice, such as the 
benefit theory, to the design of a tax system, their discussion of the benefit 
and equal sacrifice theories does not support a role for HE. In a subsequent 
portion of their article that discusses determination of the tax base, K-T do 
foreshadow an argument that has been employed by others (and examined 
below) to argue for the independence of HE on political process grounds. 
They assert that ―uniform treatment is preferable . . . out of deference to a 
democratically made decision, or as a matter of equality or autonomy.‖38 The 
next Part examines how others have further articulated what could be termed 
a ―process‖ role for HE. 
 
IV. EFFORTS TO FIND OTHER ROLES FOR HE 
 
A. HE as a Process Requirement 
 
Despite the comprehensive and persuasive arguments that HE 
collapses into VE (and that VE requires the independent selection of norms 
and criteria grounded in distributive justice), assertions have persisted in the 
tax literature that HE should play an important role in the design of a tax 
system. As Jeffrey Kahn has observed, ―[M]any persons do give weight to 
horizontal equity, and even those who do not frown on unequal treatment of 
                                                 
35. Id. at 654–55. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 655. 
38. Id. at 667–68. 
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the same item.‖39 In an effort to discern and specify the undeniable appeal of 
HE, scholars have carved out a role, but one that is not on par with VE and 
does not make claims on substantive tax policy design. Brian Galle, in a 
2008 paper, defends HE as independent of VE, primarily by constructing a 
role for HE that we contend is best understood as one grounded in the 
context of political process and political theory, and not as an independent 
policy role.
40
 The core of his argument is that HE can be understood as 
standing for the position that the pre-tax allocation of income (specifically 
the pre-tax ordinal ranking of taxpayers with similar amounts of income)
41
 
should receive deference from tax writing legislators because that allocation 
was generated under existing rules (tax and non-tax) approved by an earlier 
Congress: 
 
I want to defend here the notion that our 
accumulations of cash or contentedness, as they stand prior 
to being subjected to tax, should have some weight. I begin 
with the idea that pretax distributions may be non-random, 
and, indeed, may be the deliberately chosen result of a 
perfectly just system of laws other than the tax laws. To 
disturb that distribution might then be an injustice, or, at a 
minimum, could imply that the moral judgment of the tax-
law drafters is superior to the judgment of those who put in 
place the rest of society. HE, therefore, could represent the 
extent to which the tax system defers to explicit or implicit 
moral judgments made elsewhere in society or in 
government.  
   Put another way, suppose that we sit as lawmakers 
on a legislative committee with the authority to draft tax 
statutes, and we hold sufficient sway over our colleagues to 
obtain passage of whatever we enact. Let us posit that earlier 
this year, our colleagues enacted a farm subsidy bill whose 
distributive consequences we find appalling. Would it be 
legitimate or proper for us to enact a 100 percent tax on 
                                                 
39. Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal 
Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 652 (2006).  
40. Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (2008) 
[hereinafter Galle, Fairness]. 
41. Id. at 1359–61. The notion that HE requires the pretax ranking of 
taxpayers to be preserved is based on the idea that taxpayers who have ―equal shares 
in the pre-tax distribution‖ should have ―equal shares in the post-tax distribution.‖ 
Elkins, supra note 6, at 73. If the relative rankings of taxpayers changes after tax, 
that change may indicate that equal taxpayers are not being treated equally because 
they now have different shares.  As discussed infra, text at notes 47–50, the use of 
such rankings to measure HE is very controversial. 
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receipt of that subsidy? It is arguable, I claim, that the 
answer is no. If that intuition is correct, then it follows that 
there are constraints on tax legislation that do not arise 
purely out of distributive justice norms, but that instead 
depend on political theories, such as an obligation, again, to 
defer to the reasonable judgments of others. (Citations 
omitted).
42
 
 
Galle‘s argument here is specifically about tax reform — not the 
first tax law written at the start of society, government and the economy, but 
the tax reform contemplated in the midst of an ongoing legal, economic and 
tax system. He makes this distinction to move beyond Murphy and Nagel‘s 
claim that government and market cannot exist without taxation, and all 
must be contemplated as a totality.
43
  But why grant deference to a prior 
Congress? To support this position, Galle envisions the tax writing function 
as a tripartite role — in which one of the roles lends itself to deference to 
prior Congressional determinations:  
 
Why would we want, or be obliged, to grant such 
deference? I suggest here two possible lines of thought. 
Both lines depend on one prior assumption. I assume that 
the Tax Code comprises not one, but in fact three distinct 
governmental systems or modes: raising revenue, 
redistributing wealth, and enacting other policy goals. Each 
of these modes might have its own set of rules or norms. 
My claims about HE for the most part are limited to tax‘s 
revenue function, although the absence of HE can signal to 
us that we need to justify our tax decision by resorting to 
one of the other two modes. 
  
  Turning, then, to the two possibilities, I argue that 
HE can be justified both by the unique purpose of the 
revenue function as well as on welfare grounds. In order for 
revenue-raising to serve its basic function, and to command 
widespread popular acceptance, it must be open to any 
reasonable view of good government. It follows, albeit 
along a twisty path, that the principles underlying the 
revenue function should give significant weight to pre-
existing distributions of societal goods (footnote omitted).
44
 
 
                                                 
42. Galle, Fairness, supra note 40, at 1327. 
43. Id. at 1335. 
44. Id. at 1327–28. 
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Essentially, Galle‘s core claim (elaborated in more detail) is that the revenue 
function of tax legislation drafting does not by its own terms incorporate any 
normative component, and when exercising that function legislators should 
give deference to the prior, democratically determined choices that resulted 
in the current pre-tax distribution of resources: 
 
In particular, I argue here that, because the sole 
purpose of revenue is to make possible a flourishing 
deliberative democracy, and because it is possible that 
allowing the revenue system [i.e. the revenue function of 
new tax legislation] to make its own policy judgments would 
interfere with deliberations elsewhere, the revenue process 
should simply accept as a given, any reasonably policy 
choice.
45
 
 
Thus, in considering tax reform, legislators should not disturb the pre-tax 
ordinal ranking of taxpayers based on ―income.‖46 Galle recognizes one of 
the likely challenges to this articulation of an independent HE: that tax 
legislation is not exclusively a revenue function but includes redistribution 
and other policy goals on a regular basis and therefore this intertwined role 
provides no support for deference. In anticipation of this argument, Galle 
offers a separate justification for HE grounded in considerations of 
legislative efficiency: 
 
 For those who find this form of deontological reasoning 
unpersuasive, I also roughly model the circumstances in 
which we can expect respect for HE to increase overall 
societal welfare. Taking as given the justice of existing 
arrangements can reduce the costs of deliberating about 
alternative rules, as well as the transaction costs and 
transition costs that attend the political process. At times, 
though, these gains may be swamped by the inefficiency of 
separating redistributive ―corrections‖ from the revenue 
process itself.
47
 
 
We think that these are valuable insights, raising interesting and 
important questions about political process, particularly the iterative 
dimension of legislative drafting, but they do not defend HE as an 
independent concept of ―fairness.‖ We reach this conclusion for several  
                                                 
45. Id. at 1346. 
46. Id. at 1359–61 (noting that the pre-tax position of taxpayers reflects the 
―preferred ranking of individuals‖ by society reflected in prior legislation). 
47. Galle, Fairness, supra note 40, at 1327. 
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reasons. First, Galle‘s core claim of HE — that we should preserve the rank 
order of taxpayers — really constitutes a claim about VE. In their 1993 
article, M-R reviewed Kaplow‘s critique of economists who argued that HE 
was violated (and thus had an independent function) when a tax law change 
altered the pre-tax rankings of taxpayers. Kaplow makes a key observation: 
the process of ranking and protecting ranking actually constitutes 
assessments of and determinations about those who are not equal — which is 
the domain of VE.
48
 Further, Kaplow notes in his discussion of the 
economists on ranking (and Galle essentially agrees) — if HE only requires 
preservation of ranking, it would do very little. Why? Consider an 
abbreviated version of Kaplow‘s hypotheticals.49 In World #1, A has 100 and 
B has 95 of income before tax. HE is violated if, after tax, A has 94 and B 
has 95. However, in World #2, A has 100 and B has 95 before tax, but after 
tax A has 147 and B has 51. In this case, HE is not violated although the 
disparity between the taxpayer‘s income has increased significantly. Thus, 
consistent with Kaplow I and M-R, we would conclude that a meaningful 
application of HE here is essentially VE, and in any event is literally only 
about those who are exactly equal under the existing concept of VE.  
Second, the initial concept of the pre-tax ranking of taxpayers (which 
Galle argues HE guides us to protect) implies that we know what to count — 
what goods, services, and benefits are relevant for determining the ranking. 
But to have a ranking, we must already have in place a concept of VE to 
define what should be counted (i.e. to define the tax base). This observation 
alone is not inconsistent with Galle‘s argument, but explicitly acknowledging 
this point helps clarify precisely what Galle is claiming.  In urging that tax 
reform be particularly attentive to existing rankings he envisions that in this 
moment before tax reform there are in place both rules implementing a 
concept of VE (which defines the tax base and tax burden) and some non-tax 
legislation that together result in a ―pre-tax reform‖ ordering of taxpayers. It 
is really the net result (i.e. ordering of taxpayers by income) of the existing 
tax and non-tax legislation combined that Galle urges be protected, given his 
attention is on tax reform.
50
 Thus, Galle‘s HE is an assertion that Congress 
should not change its VE over time, at least not to the extent it could alter 
taxpayer ranking. 
                                                 
48. Kaplow, HE I, supra note 2, at 141. 
49. Kaplow, HE II, supra note 2, at 194–95. 
50. Use of the phrase ―pre-tax‖ here can be a bit confusing. It is possible 
that the world as it looks before tax reform produces the following result: under the 
combination non tax law and existing tax law taken together, certain taxpayers 
receive $X, and others receive $X +1. We understand Galle to say that a problem 
then arises if and when Congress later seeks to implement new tax legislation that 
would change the net effect of what Congress had intended, to date, to be the 
ultimate rank order of taxpayers. See generally, Galle, Fairness, supra note 40, at 
1346. 
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  Why not change VE? The answer to this leads to our third concern 
with this articulation of an independent HE. The HE argument relies on 
isolating and examining only the revenue raising function of Congress 
(because the HE question is directed exclusively at the tax burden assigned 
to a particular tax payer — and not the totality of that taxpayers experience 
with the government). However, in reality there are no such constraints on 
Congress — it is free to act in any and all capacities simultaneously — and it 
does so. Legislation regularly reflects a mixture of revenue, redistribution 
and non-tax policy goals.  Given this observation, an argument for HE 
grounded in only the revenue function provides no discernible guidance. 
Moreover, it begs the reverse question, ―Is it undesirable for Congress to 
undo existing tax policy (rooted in its redistributed and other policy goals) 
through reforms outside the tax law?‖ Ultimately, the decisions of a later 
Congress on tax reform may be best understood as part of both the messy 
dynamics of the political process and the smoothing process of the 
republican form of government in which power shifts are meant to occur 
gradually through the different and overlapping electoral schedules of the 
President, Senate, and House of Representatives. 
Finally, Galle‘s grounding of HE in an efficiency analysis — 
suggesting costs savings can be generated by assuming the fairness of 
existing distributions and not engaging in additional tax reform — joins an 
active dialogue regarding legislative process and efficiency. But as with 
other efforts described earlier to secure a distinct place for HE, we do not 
consider this an example of HE used to prescribe a self-contained notion of 
fairness for taxpayers. Rather, it is use of HE terminology in a different 
conversation about efficiency-based assessments of the legislative process. 
By introducing the concept of efficiency as a method to evaluate that 
process, Galle is appealing to a different form of distributive justice in order 
to add content to HE. 
  While we disagree with Galle‘s defense of HE, we think that he has 
insightfully pointed future debate about HE in the correct direction — one 
that connects the persistence of HE to the underlying theme of equality 
among citizens and the expectation that the government only make changes 
based on careful consideration and articulated reasoning. HE refuses to 
perish because it represents a presumption for equal treatment under the laws 
of an egalitarian society. In a related area, a debate about whether equality is 
an empty concept in the context of the Constitution has occurred.
51
 
Surprising agreement exists between those who view equality as an empty 
concept and those who do not that the government should be required to act 
for appropriate reasons. That is, even those who argue that equality is an 
                                                 
51. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 23 at 547–48; see also, e.g., Burton, supra 
note 23; Chemerinsky, supra note 23; Greenawalt, supra note 23; Karst, supra note 
23. 
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empty concept agree that persons should be protected from government 
acting for the wrong reason.
52
 For example, Christopher Peters has argued 
that the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
53
 in which the plaintiff was denied a 
laundry license because of his race, should not be viewed as requiring 
equality of treatment, but rather requiring that the government correctly 
apply a substantive rule that privileges should not be granted or denied based 
on race or ethnicity. Peters asserts that equality is empty because it requires 
one to look to an underlying substantive rule, but once the substantive rule is 
identified (race is irrelevant) the government must correctly apply such rule. 
Similarly, Kenneth Simons, an advocate for equality having independent 
significance, argues that equality requires that the government explain why it 
is treating people differently.
54
 He states that a ―demand for reasons for 
inequality is one important type of equality right. . . .‖55  
  Thus, there is surprising unanimity for a justificatory role for 
equality in a different area of law.  Perhaps, the lingering (languishing) 
loyalty to HE in the tax literature reflects this role. HE remains in our 
collective tax consciousness because in a democratic society we expect an 
explanation for why people are being treated differently. HE tells us that 
government should communicate the rationale for different treatment; it does 
not tell us what that different treatment should be.   
 
B. HE as Even-Handed Enforcement 
 
  Up to this point the strongest articulation of an independent role for 
HE is a secondary one: ensuring that the government demonstrates it has 
carefully considered tax laws that produce different taxation (i.e. different 
tax bills), given the broad-based commitment to equal treatment in the legal 
system. Thus, HE here is not doing the work comparable to VE, which 
serves (albeit indirectly) as the vehicle for framing our views on the 
appropriate burden borne by each taxpayer. Rather, HE should be seen as 
addressing another part of the regime — not the design of the system, but the 
process of design.  
A careful review of the proponents of HE, however, reveals that 
many supporters of HE draw upon a role for HE in the administration of the 
tax law. Joseph Dodge has argued that HE serves as a check on the 
application of utilitarian welfare to individuals. He states:  
  
                                                 
52. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1210, 1219–20 (1997). 
53. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
54. Simons, Egalitarian Norms, supra note 13, at 714, 748. 
55. Id. at 748. 
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Horizontal equity derives from the command that 
likes should be treated alike, which is a maxim of civil 
justice whose origins predate, and are independent from, 
welfare economics. . . . Of course, the horizontal equity 
norm in taxation is incomplete, because it leaves unspecified 
the index of comparison (for example, ability to pay, 
standard of living, income and so on). . . . Theories of 
redistribution can be contractarian, utilitarian, or religion-
based, but conventional welfare economics is utilitarian, 
since it inquires into the net social gains and losses from a 
given policy. It is characteristic (and perhaps a weakness) of 
utilitarian thinking that the welfare of the individual is 
readily subordinated to collective welfare. The ethical 
command that likes should be treated alike is similar to 
concepts of ―rights‖ in imposing limits on the utilitarian 
approach.
56
 
 
  We interpret Dodge‘s argument to mean that the right to equal 
treatment is not a principle of design but instead a principle of conduct that 
controls all governmental interaction with citizens. Indeed, in a subsequent 
article, Dodge describes HE and VE as ―formal norms‖ that ―equally-situated 
persons should be treated equally‖ and ―unequally-situated persons should be 
taxed differently to an appropriate degree.‖57 He uses the term ―formal norm‖ 
in the Rawlsian sense of meaning the process by which laws are 
administered.
58
 He goes on to observe that ―substantive norms‖ then provide 
a standard to measure equality: 
 
The role of ―substantive‖ tax fairness norms is to provide an 
index or standard of relevant equality and inequality. The  
                                                 
56. Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Market-to-Market and Pass-Through 
Corporate-Shareholder Intergration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 276 n.42 
(1995). 
57. Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, 
Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 401 (2005) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice]. 
58. Id. at 453 (―This idea of fairness — which otherwise can be referred to 
as ‗formal justice‘ and (in its tax version) as horizontal equity — has considerable 
value in itself.‖). At the end of this sentence Professor Dodge cites to Rawls. Id. at 
453 n.222 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 58–60 (1971)).  In the pages 
referenced by Dodge, Rawls states, ―If we think of justice as always expressing a 
kind of equality, then formal justice requires that in their administration laws and 
institutions should apply equally (that is, in the same way) to those belonging to the 
classes defined by them.  . . . Formal justice is adherence to principle, or as some 
have said, obedience to system.‖  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 58 (1971). 
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most commonly cited substantive tax fairness norms include: 
(1) the equal-sacrifice norm, (2) the benefits-received-from-
government norm, (3) the ―well-being‖ (or ―standard-of-
living‖) norm, and (4) the ability-to-pay norm. 59 
 
   The notion that HE militates against the arbitrary enforcement of tax 
law has also been championed by John A. Miller. He has observed:  
 
The conclusions offered by McDaniel and Repetti are sound 
in a narrow pedantic sense. My concern is that their analysis 
fails to allow for the more primitive and malevolent 
possibilities of human existence. They assume a societal 
rationality and rule mindedness that assures equality even 
without relying on the principle of equality. Belief in the 
importance of the principle of equality, on the other hand, 
assumes that humanity possesses a limitless propensity for 
persecution and arbitrariness. It is in the context of an 
irrational and discriminatory world that equality‘s meaning 
and utility stand out.
60
 
 
The role for HE proposed by Miller is similar to that proposed by Dodge and 
Musgrave. He views HE as a check on arbitrary or even pernicious 
application of tax laws to taxpayers. We believe that the common thread 
running through all of these articulations of an administrative role for HE 
could be stated perhaps more bluntly and with particular force in the case of 
the income tax system. HE plays a distinct, separate and effectively 
operational role. As a general concept, which could be applicable to 
government rules and actions beyond the tax arena, HE holds that although 
the concept of VE can comprehensively account for equity concerns
61
 in the 
design of our substantive tax law, something more is needed to address the 
operational concern that the law (crafted under a vision of VE) need be 
implemented by government actors in a manner consistent with the terms of 
the tax law. Essentially, HE steps in at this secondary stage to serve as an 
explicit warning that the law should be applied uniformly. Perhaps this could 
be taken as an implicit expectation of any just and democratic government. 
But isolating this concern — particularly on behalf of individual members of 
society in their dealings with the arguably significant power of the state —  
  
                                                 
59. Dodge, Theory of Tax Justice, supra note 57, at 401. 
60. John A. Miller, Equal Taxation: A Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
529, 536 (2000). 
61. Of course, as articulated above, VE lacks internal normative content and 
must draw upon some theory of distributive justice and morality. 
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can serve as a constant reminder to state actors that good laws are 
insufficient.  Society demands good enforcement as well. 
  This secondary, administration-oriented role of HE may be 
singularly important in tax law.  Although one could imagine a tax system 
with entirely transparent filings, audits and tax payments, that is not the U.S. 
system, nor is it common in other comparable tax systems. As a result, there 
is little opportunity to verify whether the tax law is being applied in a 
sufficiently consistent manner. Litigated cases can provide a limited window 
on tax enforcement, but they represent a small fraction of the many 
interactions between the government and taxpayers. Moreover, the primary 
facts available to the outsider are those the judge has chosen to include in the 
opinion. Thus, while case law can assist in understanding positions asserted 
by the government against taxpayers‘ interests (hence the litigation), it does 
little to quell the concern that the government may not be applying the law 
uniformly. The constant reminder regarding uniformity, framed in the 
compelling language of HE, implicitly elevates the standard for 
administration to the same level as the standard for substantive law design 
(VE). The prominence of HE promotes society‘s goals of norm building in 
the administrative state and constraining government actors with power and 
limited public scrutiny. 
  The difficulty with this analysis is that HE is not helpful in insuring 
even-handed enforcement. In a world of finite resources, not every taxpayer 
can be audited.
62
 In deciding who should be audited, it is necessary to refer to 
something beyond HE. For example, such choices may seek to maximize 
utility —  target the taxpayers from whom we can expect to obtain the 
greatest additional tax revenue (such as those engaged in cash businesses), or 
they may seek to reinforce progressivity — target high-income taxpayers to 
insure that they are bearing a progressively greater burden. HE does not 
guide us in selecting among these objectives. It is necessary to once again 
appeal to some other source to decide how to best accomplish enforcement.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In the years since Musgrave‘s, Kaplow‘s and M-R‘s work evaluating 
the intellectual landscape on HE, the question has continued to generate 
controversy and debate. Perhaps one way to encapsulate the question after all 
this time is to ask — if we started with HE as our motivating concept in 
setting tax policy and burdens where would we be? If HE says treat equals 
the same, what does our tax system look like? The answer is — we don‘t 
know because the term has no independent meaning for fairness and  
                                                 
62. The IRS examined 1.11 percent of returns filed by individuals in 2010. 
IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE DATA BOOK 2011, tbl. 9b (March 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf. 
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equality. We must turn to some theory of distributive justice to determine 
equality and to determine an appropriate tax burden. At this point HE 
collapses into one concept, which is generally referred to as VE.  The crucial 
point is not that this single concept is VE, but that VE and HE are together a 
single concept which lacks normative content and is itself only a proxy for 
theories of distributive justice and morality.  It is a detour in history that led 
us to frame the issues of equality and fairness in the tax system in the 
language of VE and HE — a path which has both masked the emptiness of 
the concepts and overemphasized the possibility of two, distinct fairness 
inquires. We have been side-tracked from our larger task of tackling our 
disagreements over the underlying questions of distributive justice and 
morality, but perhaps can return now with renewed vigor to these intractable 
questions.   
  For those who remain committed to a gut sense that HE means 
something, we would say, ―yes, but a different something.‖ While HE is not 
helpful in designing a tax system because it provides no guidance about what 
the system should look like, support for HE has persisted because of a shared 
belief that government should communicate the rationale for treating people 
differently. The difficulty is that while HE may tell us that government 
should communicate the rationale for different treatment, it does not tell us 
what that different treatment should be. Support for the role of HE may also 
be rooted in the notion that government should be even-handed in its 
enforcement of tax laws. HE is not helpful, however, in insuring even-
handed enforcement since, in a world of finite resources, not every taxpayer 
can be audited. In deciding who should be audited, it is necessary to refer to 
something beyond HE.  But perhaps the close link of tax policy to the 
process of tax policy creation and the administrative practice explains the 
unstated but visceral commitment to HE that has continued to spark debate 
over the past 20 years. We do not imagine the debate is over, but we look 
forward to a deepening inquiry into the driving questions of distributive 
justice and morality as pillars of our tax policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
